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Introduction
Over the last decades, there have been many legal reforms aimed at improving the position of women by increasing their political power in the public sphere. Gender quotas are prominent among them. Half of the countries nowadays use some type of electoral quota for their parliament. 1 The core idea behind such quotas is to recruit women into positions of leadership and to ensure that women have influence over decision making processes, advancing representation and possibly producing downstream effects on attitudes towards women and their influence in other political fora. A considerable literature suggests that gender quotas can lead to changes in the type of public goods provided (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004) , the role of women in the community and attitudes towards them (Beaman et al., 2012; Bhavnani, 2009) . This literature has largely focused on the impact of legal reforms -reserved seats, legal candidate quotas, and political party quotas -implemented by governments. However, there is no guarantee that similar results will obtain if gender parity is introduced through other means, such as development organizations who lack the legal leverage but are often the only vehicle for social change when the state is weak (Mansuri and Rao, 2013) . In this study, we explore the effects of gender quotas imposed by foreign development organizations in small rural communities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) . 2 There are a number of reasons to expand the focus beyond the use of legal gender quota reforms to similar institutional innovations implemented by development agencies.
First, gender quotas are a popular tool in development programming. That is, the optimism around the impact of gender quotas has shaped development practice and women's roles and rights are now a central component to many development programs. For example, since the 1990s, "participatory development," and community-driven development (CDD) programs in particular, has become a favored model for development. 3 As part of these programs, development agencies very often mandate some sort of women's participation.
The GoBifo program in Sierra Leone (studied by e.g. Casey et al. (2013) ) required that one of the three co-signatories on the community bank account be female; encouraged women to manage their own projects; made evidence of inclusion in project implementation a prerequisite for the release of funding tranches; and required field staff to record how many women and youth attended and spoke up in meetings. The NSP program in Afghanistan 1 Source: http://www.quotaproject.org/. 2 By women's empowerment we refer broadly to women's ability to influence the allocation of resources that are relevant for their well-being. This is broadly consistent with definitions given in Kabeer (2000) and Narayan-Parker (2002) though more focused on collective decision making. More precise operationalizations are introduced below.
3 Mansuri and Rao (2013) quote a figure of $85bn in World Bank spending in the last decade alone on this broad class of interventions.
(studied by e.g. Beath et al. (2013) ) established gender-balanced village development councils, mandated involvement of women in council elections and in the selection of village development projects, as well as the implementation of at least one project that should specifically benefit women. 4 A second reason to focus on gender parity provisions introduced by development actors is that they are often the actors most likely to promote such innovations. In many developing countries -including many in which issues related to women's empowerment are salient -the reach of the government is limited. Many state functions are undertaken by development agencies and it are these actors that are often most likely to implement public projects at scale. In these contexts, development actors may thus control the practical mechanisms to undertake activities to improve the role of women.
Finally, while development actors may be the actors most likely to apply these innovations, the lessons from the experiences of government actors may not extend to them.
Points of difference include the legitimacy that they enjoy -which may be greater or less than the state's in different contexts. Another difference is that the innovations they introduce may be less structural in nature. Quotas studied in other contexts often focus on reforms to existing formal, long-lived, electoral institutions. In contrast, development actors often create new, short-lived, parallel institutions -for example a committee with gender parity that manages the implementation of a development project -that may not enjoy the institutional strength needed to impose meaningful constraints on actual decision making. 5 We return to these and other differences below when we discuss differences in our findings compared to the existing literature.
To assess the impact of gender quotas implemented by external development actors on women's empowerment, we build on a field experiment that was implemented between 2007 and 2010 in 661 communities in the DRC. As part of a CDD program, communities participated in elections to select ten-member management committees, which were responsible for overseeing a development project of $3,000 in their community. 6 In a randomly selected half of the villages, the committees were required to contain five men and five women. In the other half, the communities were free to choose the committee's gender composition.
The random allocation of gender parity requirements allows us to assess the causal impact of development agencies' efforts to place women in leadership positions on the subsequent empowerment of women.
We explore the impact of promoting women's access to leadership positions across three outcomes. First, we use project records collected by our implementing partner across all 661 villages to learn about project selection for the CDD program. Second, we examine project selection and the position of women in the community after the program. To measure these downstream effects, we introduced an independent, unconditional cash transfer intervention implemented by local universities in a random sample of the parity and non-parity areas after the field experiment. Selected communities (one village in each cluster of villages, selected proportionate to size) received $1,000, which they could manage without conditions or oversight over a two month period. Comparing differences in implementation of this program between parity and non-parity communities (Were different projects selected?
Did women take leading roles in managing the $1,000?), allows us to measure decisions on public goods provision and actual behavior related to women's role in their community.
Finally, we build on data on citizen attitudes to learn about individuals' attitudes towards women.
Across a range of measures we find no evidence that promoting women's access to leadership positions has an effect on women's empowerment. The intervention did not lead to clear changes in the type of public goods provided during the program. We also find no evidence of effects on project selection and the position of women in the community after the program. There is also no evidence that the treatment led to different attitudes towards women regarding their role in the community. The coefficient sizes that we find are small. For instance, one of the strongest results suggests that the gender quota increases the share of women that were a member in a later development project committee by 1.7 percentage points from a baseline of 22 percent. Many coefficients also point in the opposite direction of what was expected. We further discuss whether the null result stems from differences in context or differences in the nature of the intervention, relative to successful cases elsewhere. Finally, the lack of average effects on project choice is likely due to the fact that there are few differences in self-reported project preferences between women and men at baseline. Yet supplementary analysis suggests that even when these differences do exist, women's preferences are not more likely to prevail in treated areas.
Evidence from this case and elsewhere suggests that differences may be attributable to the relative weakness of social interventions by development organizations in terms of levels of engagement, duration of interventions, and delegation of decision making responsibility.
As noted, the positive evidence related to gender quotas to date is largely drawn from cases where these innovations were introduced by governments using legal reforms to existing institutions. These findings have inspired development practitioners who seek to introduce similar changes through similar institutional innovations. Our null findings from Congo highlight the challenge of drawing inferences across cases on the effects of very different 4 types of institutional reforms for tackling gender inequality.
In the next section we introduce previous work related to gender quotas. Section 3 anchors this study in the Congolese context, describing both the position of women and and pre-existing decision making structures. Section 4 discusses the field experiment and measurement strategy. Section 5 presents the results. We discuss our results in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
Previous Work on Women in Leadership Positions
The literature to date has largely built on the case of India to learn about the impact of gender quotas. In 1992, a constitutional amendment was adopted in India that mandated that one-third of all seats on village councils (GPs) and a third of all presidencies of these councils be reserved for women. Many states randomly rotate the council seats and presidencies reserved for women, which allowed researchers to make causal claims about this policy. A first set of studies explores how this reform affects policy choices. 7 Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) compare reserved and unreserved village councils in India's West Bengal and Rajasthan, and find that having women in leadership positions leads to more investment in public goods in sectors in which women have expressed a preference and less in those that are more closely linked to men's concerns. In contrast, Ban and Rao (2008) explore data from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu and find no evidence that women politicians make decisions that are more in line with the needs of women. From these studies we posit the hypothesis that mandating women in leadership positions has an effect on the type of public goods provided, and assess whether this holds in a setting in which the institutional innovation is introduced by development agencies.
Other studies examine downstream effects on political outcomes and attitudes towards women. Beaman et al. (2012) find that prior exposure to a female village council leader leads to electoral gains for women. They suggest that reservations work because it improves perceptions of female leader effectiveness and weakens stereotypes about gender roles in the public and domestic spheres. In related work, Beaman et al. (2009) argue that exposure to women leadership counters men's bias against women's effectiveness in leadership positions -though changing broader attitudes and norms appear more difficult. Similarly, Bhavnani (2009) shows that the probability of a woman winning office is five times higher where the constituency was reserved for women in the previous election. He shows that reservations introduce into politics women who are able to win elections after reservations lapse and increase the willingness of parties to grant women tickets. Exploiting a natural experiment in Sweden, O'Brien and Rickne (2016) find that quotas have a positive impact on women's selection (but not reappointment) to top political posts. 8 Related to Africa, Clayton (2014) exploits a subnational randomized policy experiment in Lesotho with singlemember districts reserved for female community councilors, and finds that electoral gender quotas have a negative impact on the political engagement of female citizens. She argues that this result stems from female citizens' suspicion of affirmative action measures for women in politics rather than an overall rejection of female representation. 9 Following these studies we test two additional hypotheses: mandating women leadership strengthens their role in the community more broadly, and improves attitudes towards them.
The current literature has thus focused largely on the impact of legal reforms of existing institutions. In contrast, our study investigates whether similar institutional innovations can improve the position of women when implemented by development actors. We know of only one other paper with a similar focus to ours. Beath et al. (2013) examine the effect on women's empowerment of a development program in Afghanistan that mandated women's community participation. 10 The program had positive effects on the acceptance of female participation in local governance, and their engagement in income-generating activities, but it did not affect women's roles in household decision-making or attitudes towards the general role of women in the community. Our study diverges in three important ways. First, the development program under study in Beath et al. (2013) was a compound intervention that included both the creation of elected gender-balanced local councils and the allocation of funds. Cleanly disentangling the effects of placing women in leadership positions from a resource-effect requires independent variation in the institutions and the fund allocations, which we do in this study. Second, to measure women's empowerment, Beath et al. (2013) make use of direct questioning in surveys and focus groups. These strategies, however, may be prone to social desirability bias, especially after activities are undertaken to empower women. In response, in addition to the survey data, this study builds on project data about project choice and measures collected during the implementation of an independent, unconditional transfer program, which we carried out after the field experiment. This additional activity allows us to obtain information about actual behavior related to women's empowerment. The third contribution relates to scope. Beath et al. (2013) focus on attitudes towards women and their role within the household and community. In this study we also explore the impact on policy decisions. As we saw above, efforts to improve women's empowerment may affect the types of public goods provided. Our data allows us 8 In fact, Besley et al. (2017) show how this imposed quota increased the competence of the political class in Sweden by reducing the share of mediocre men.
9 Barnes and Burchard (2012) , in contrast, use data from twenty sub-Saharan African countries and show that increased representation of women in parliament is positively related to women's political engagement. 10 Mansuri and Rao (2013) also reference a paper by Leino (2007) that is not currently publicly available.
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to test this claim in the Congo.
Context

Women in Eastern Congo
Congo scores poorly when it comes to the status of women, possibly reflecting the continued importance of traditional structures and decades of poor governance and chronic conflict.
Despite diversity in their beliefs and practices, all ethnic groups in Congo share underlying gender inequality (CEDAW, 2011) . Congolese law reflects these inequalities. By law, the man is the head of the family, and the woman manages the household. 11 Women face restrictions on their freedom of movement and access to public spaces. By law, married women are obliged to live in a residence of their husband's choosing, and cannot apply for a passport without their husband's consent. 12 The position of women has likely worsened due to conflict, which has engulfed the country over the last two decades. (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) . The latter, with the direct involvement of eight African nations and 25 armed groups, has been the deadliest war in modern African history (IRC, 2007) . Despite the formal end to the war in July 2003, much of the program area continues to experience conflict.
14 According to the Congolese Minister for Gender, Family, and Children, more than one million women and girls (of a total population of 70 million) have been victim of sexual violence (HRW, 2009) . Recent studies show that these numbers are likely to be an understatement, with some estimating that an average of 121 per 1000 women of reproductive age have been raped in their lifetime (Peterman et al., 2011) . Particularly noteworthy is that most (sexual) violence against women takes place within the household, with an estimated 221 per 1000 women experiencing intimate partner sexual violence (Peterman et al., 2011) . This result is in line with international research indicating that intimate partner sexual violence is the most pervasive form of violence against women (e.g. Heise et al. (2002) Our data also shed light on the position of Congolese women in their communities. For example, we asked respondents whether they attended a village meeting during the six months preceding the survey. About 44% of male respondents answered 'yes', while this was the case for only 28% of female respondents. Among those that attended a meeting, we asked whether they spoke up during the last meeting. Men report to have given their opinion in 71% of cases, while women only did so in 37% of the cases. These differences between men and women are statistically strong as well as substantively large (p < 0.001).
These difference in participation also arise when it comes to national level politics. As we saw above, citizen's knowledge about the national government is generally low among the Congolese populace. However, we find that this knowledge is particularly low for women respondents who can only correctly mention the name of the country's ruling party in 16% of the cases, while 36% of men can correctly report the ruling party. Similarly, while 24% of men can correctly report the name of the country's prime minister, this number decreases to 10% for female respondents.
Finally, we explore attitudes towards women. We asked our respondents to position themselves on four statements related to women's rights and roles: 1) Women should have the same rights as men; 2) If a man mistreats his wife she has a right to complain; 3) A woman should have the same opportunities as men to occupy socio-administrative positions in the village; 4) Women have knowledge to contribute and so should be eligible to serve as presidents of development committees in the village. We create a score that equals 1 (2) for those (strongly) agreeing with the statement, and -1 (-2) for those (strongly) disagreeing. Respondents may also register as indifferent (0). Table 2 presents the responses by gender. We find that, on average, men in Eastern Congo often agree with the empowering statement. Surprisingly perhaps, in our sample women agree less than men with the empowering statements, although the differences across genders are not statistically significant. Notes: Differences in attitudes by gender. We report sample average treatment effects. Regressions use block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village cluster level. Based on question QG8-QG11. * p ≤ 0.10, * * p ≤ 0.05, * * * p ≤ 0.01.
The Institutional Context at the Community Level
The development program we study created committees responsible for managing project funds. Our implementing partner used these committees as a vehicle to place women in leadership positions. To understand the impact of this institutional innovation, we also briefly introduce the existing local institutional context in which these committees were created.
The village chief is the most important decision maker at the local level in Congolese villages. The chief -almost always male (from our data less than 2.5% of chiefs are women) -is responsible for land allocation, resolving disputes, public goods provision, and other issues related to the community. There are at least two reasons why chiefs play such a key role. First, the chief controls within village resources such as land (e.g. Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005) for the DRC). Second, chiefs enjoy popular legitimacy, giving the chief a moral claim to his position. That traditional leaders play a central role to community life is the case in much of the developing world (e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2014) , Logan (2013) ).
Our data confirms the claim that chiefs enjoy popular legitimacy when it comes to village governance. To assess legitimacy we gave each respondent a hypothetical scenario in which the village received funds, and asked who should have most influence on beneficiary selection. A majority of respondents (51%) stated that this should be the village chief;
other often-mentioned actors largely come from within the village: villagers (23%), village wise men (8%), religious leaders (10%), and youth associations (1%). Few respondents mentioned women associations (1%), chiefdom leader (1%), or the Congolese government (2%), and 5% of respondents are of the opinion that nobody should have most influence. We find that men and women have very similar opinions about the role the village chief should take: 51% of women is of the opinion that the village chief should decide on beneficiary selection, while this is 52% for men. 20
In sum, in Eastern Congo a largely male institution controls decision making but does so with broad support from both men and women.
A Field Experiment in Eastern Congo
A Community-Driven Development Program
This study draws on variation produced by a large scale development program, "Tuun- 
The Gender Parity Treatment
In 2006, prior to the start of the program the subsequent year, the research team worked together with the implementing partner to design Tuungane in such a way to assess the impact of women in leadership positions. Specifically, a random subset of all Tuungane villages were assigned to a gender parity condition: the ten-member strong VDC committees were required to contain five men and five women: one man and one women would occupy each position. 26 In another random subset of villages this requirement did not exist, and communities were free to choose the gender composition of their Tuungane VDC committees. The treatment effect we explore is thus the impact of a gender parity provision.
This type of provision reflects common donor practices. We discuss the salience of a 50%
provision compared with other possibilities in Section 6.2.
Assignment to the Gender Parity Treatment and Identification
The details of the randomization procedure are as follows. Table 3 maps the total number of village clusters per block that entered the lottery and the number of village clusters assigned to the parity treatment. We see that in all but two cases, half of the lottery participants are selected to the treatment. 30 In total, 75 village clusters (and thus all 337 VDCs in those clusters) were randomly assigned to the gender parity treatment.
The other 74 clusters (325 VDCs) were free to choose the gender composition of their VDC committee. In the remainder of the paper we will only focus on those areas that entered the parity lottery.
The creation of a parity treatment and control group, which share the same characteristics in expectation before the onset of the program, allows us to investigate the causal impact of having women in leadership positions. Table 10 in Appendix B shows evidence that the randomization procedure was successful in ensuring substantive balance between the gender parity treatment and control group. This study's empirical strategy is therefore straightforward. In the next section we compare mean outcomes in parity and non-parity communities that participated in the parity lottery, which provides unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect (Rubin, 1974) . For efficiency reasons we report sample average treatment effects, ignoring small differences in sampling of individuals in different sized households to the survey and in sampling different sized village within clusters. We use 27 Not all 83 blocks participated for logistical reasons. 28 In the case of blocks with odd numbers of village clusters the target was itself set randomly so that 50% assignment probabilities were maintained. 29 We again ensured 50% assignment probabilities in cases where an odd number of village clusters were selected into the lottery within a block.
30 That in two cases not half of the lottery participants are selected for gender parity is likely the result of data inconsistencies. Note that the block in which all village clusters are assigned to parity drops out because we use block fixed effects. Excluding the remaining block from the analysis gives similar results as those reported in the main text. Table shows distribution of the 43 blocks in terms of block size (rows) and the number of clusters in the parity condition (columns) according to project data. block fixed effects to control for average differences across blocks (assignment propensities were the same inach each block), and cluster our standard errors at the village cluster level for those analyses with more than one observation per cluster.
Measuring Women's Empowerment
A difficulty with measuring possible sensitive social outcomes -such as the role of women -is that responses may reflect different types of desirability biases. Respondents may provide answers to survey questions that reflect what they believe researchers want to hear.
Lab-in-the-field type measures can also face problems. They can suffer from an interpretation challenge: we might observe unbiased effects but those effects may be measured on a metric with no clear real-life interpretation. In response, this study exploits direct behavioral measures generated through an independent cash delivery project ("Recherche-Action sur les Projets d'Impact pour le Développement," henceforth RAPID). Between 2010 and 2012, RAPID visited one village in each Tuungane village cluster and implemented an unconditional cash transfer program in which the villages received grants of $1,000 to be used on projects that benefit the village. Communities were able to identify and implement projects subject to minimal constraints. 31 Importantly, the unconditional cash transfer 31 The key constraints were that some uses were ruled out if these were likely to result in harm (such as the purchase of weapons) and the grant had to be spent out within a two month period -in order to be able to assess the use of funds in a timely manner.
left communities free to decide who should manage the funds and how decisions should be made. We rolled the RAPID project out in four steps (A-D) over the course of 2-3 months. The key features are described in Table 4 , including the data that we collected during project implementation. The RAPID project allows us to measure actual behavior related to women's empowerment. For example, there was no constraint placed on the composition of the RAPID committee other than size (at least 2 members and no more than 8). An examination of the composition of RAPID committees thus provides an opportunity to assess whether having had women in leadership positions during Tuuungane lasted over time. We will discuss our outcome measures in detail in the next section.
Data Sources and Attrition
Our study builds on multiple data sources. To learn about project selection for the Tuungane program we build on project records collected by our implementing partner. To learn about the the downstream effects on project selection for the RAPID program and the position of women in the community, we build on data collected as part of the RAPID project. As discussed above, we aimed to implement RAPID in one (randomly selected) community in each of the 149 village clusters. In total, we were able to implement
Step A-C in 105 villages (54 parity, 51 control), and
Step D in 103 villages (52 parity, 51 control). There are a number of reasons for attrition. Chief among these reasons was data loss in one of the three provinces taking part in the gender parity lotteries, Maniema.
Political tensions in Maniema in the run up to the 2011 elections led to the expulsion of our teams from the entire province. Other data loss occurred due to inaccessibility of communities for security and logistical reasons, which include theft of tablets. Since attrition primarily took place at the block level or above, there is near perfect parity in the rate of attrition between treated and untreated units. We provide a more detailed discussion in Appendix C, where we establish that there is no relation between the data loss and parity treatment status. 32
Our third outcome of interest are downstream effects on attitudes, which builds on data collected during RAPID's Step D. Furthermore, in parallel to
Step D, we visited a second (randomly selected) community in each of the 149 village clusters. In these communities, which did not receive RAPID, we only conducted the household survey among five randomly selected households (half men, half women). We were able to collect information in 97 communities (50 parity, 47 control). Again, in appendix C we show how there is no relation between the data loss and parity treatment status. Results in Section 5.3 build on
Step D data from both RAPID and these survey-only villages, adding up to 200 villages.
Project Implementation and Manipulation Check
Before moving to the results, we verify that the gender parity treatment was actually an assignment to the non-parity condition to 11 clusters that the research team data records as assigned to parity. This discrepancy likely reflects errors in record keeping. We report results based on project data in Appendix F, where we present very similar results.
Furthermore, in Appendix G we present results based on local average treatment effects, where we instrument project data by research data. Again, we obtain very similar results.
Do VDCs in communities assigned to gender parity actually contain more women?
The distribution of women on the VDC committee is presented in the top row in Figure   3 , where we separate nonparity and parity areas. We find significantly fewer women on VDC committees in areas where gender parity was not mandated. Based on research data we find that women hold around 4.7 of the ten VDC seats in parity areas. In nonparity areas, communities voted, on average, only 3.1 women to the management committee. 33
Regressing the number of women VDC members on the parity requirement, we find that the difference is statistically significant (p<0.001). We now explore if the gender parity treatment had an impact on women's empowerment.
Results
We explore the impact of women in leadership positions on three outcomes. First, project selection for the Tuungane program. Second, the downstream effects on project selection for the RAPID program and the position of women in community decision-making. And, finally, the downstream effects on attitudes.
Project Selection
We first assess whether gender parity has an impact on project selection for Tuungane. The communities taking part in Tuungane implemented a wide variety of projects. 34 Table 5 shows that projects related to education are particularly popular, accounting for more than half of all projects. Water and sanitation (Watsan) and health projects account for around 18% and 12% of all projects in control areas, respectively. Agriculture and transport projects are the least popular. 35 Overall, we find largely similar patterns in areas with and without gender parity. The dominant project type, education, is selected with similar frequency in parity and nonparity areas. There is some evidence that having women on the Tuungane VDC committee leads to a drop in the selection of water and sanitation projects, though we note that this is just one of five analyses and not indicative of strong differences in project choices. 36 Finally, we conduct an omnibus test on the null hypothesis that project choices in parity and nonparity conditions are drawn from the same theoretical distribution. We fail to reject the hypothesis with a p-value of 0.45 in a χ 2 test. 37
One reason for this null result may be the fact that, on average, women's preferences are similar to men's preferences (Table 1) , which suggests that this was a setting in which 33 Based on project data these numbers are 5 and 2.7, respective. 34 A number of VDCs implemented more than one Tuungane project. At times also in different sectors. The dependent variable is the share of projects selected by a VDC in a sector.
35 The project shares do not sum to one because of an 'Other' category (5% of projects). 36 Note that this finding is different from the result found in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) where women's leadership was associated with a greater investment in Watsan (a sector favored by women in that study).
37 The simple χ 2 ignores the blocking and cluster function; taking a p value from a F test following a multinomial logit model produces a similar result.
descriptive representation is not needed to produce substantive representation, at least in terms of these sectoral priorities. 38 This does not preclude the possibility that the intervention could influence behaviors and attitudes, which we turn to next. 
Downstream Behavioral Effects
The downstream effects on RAPID project selection are perhaps more important than the direct effects on Tuungane project choice. Whereas the Tuungane projects were implemented with guidance from the implementing partner -which might have affected the projects selected 39 -communities were entirely free to choose a RAPID project, which was subsequently implemented with minimal oversight. Moreover, RAPID took place after the Tuungane program, which makes it possible to investigate whether impacts of women in leadership positions last over time. Table 6 shows that project choice for RAPID is quite different than choices under Tuungane, with 30% of all RAPID projects chosen falling in the agriculture sector. This sector includes projects like goat raising and the distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural goods such as seeds. 40 Given RAPID's shorter term period (two months compared to two years for Tuungane) and smaller budget ($1,000 instead of Tuungane's $3,000), a focus on projects in this sector is not surprising. Table 6 shows that RAPID project selection, like Tuungane project selection, is largely similar in areas with and without gender parity. There is some evidence for greater in-38 In Table 12 in Appendix D we present results conditional on being in the same area as discussed in the remainder of the section. We find similar results.
39 Anecdotal evidence suggests that implementing agents at times nudged communities towards certain types of projects. See also Humphreys et al. (2006) who find strong influence of discussion leaders in free deliberations.
40 The project shares do not sum to one because of an 'Other' category (5% of projects).
vestment in transport, but no differences in investments in Watsan or any of the other sectors. We thus find no evidence that the parity intervention led to greater reflection of women's preferences in project selection. We again conduct an omnibus test to test whether RAPID project choices are different across nonparity and parity conditions. We do not find evidence that this is the case (p=0.16). For the RAPID project choice we can implement a still finer analysis to assess whether the parity treatment influenced women's ability to have their preferences translate into village level choices. That is, we assess whether women's stated preferences translate into project choices at higher rates (relative to men's preferences) in parity areas. The advantage of this analysis is that it could pick up the effects of differences that may exist in preferences between genders even if on average there are few differences. Results are shown in Table   13 in Appendix E. There are two striking results. First, there is little evidence for male dominance in control conditions. Second, the parity condition, if anything, renders women's preferences (albeit post-treatment preferences) less predictive of outcomes relative to men's preferences.
Next, we examine three finer-grained behavioral measures on inputs to community decision making. First, during
Step A, we recorded the number of people that attended the initial meeting to learn about the RAPID project. For the project we asked for an attendance rates of 25% or more. No compensation was provided for participation. We recorded attendance rates by men and women. Second, during this initial RAPID meeting, communities discussed their preferences for a RAPID project. Our enumerators observed this discussion and recorded how many and which citizens were active in the conversation, coding in detail the number of interventions by gender and age category of the speaker, the length of the interventions, as well as to whom the interventions were directed. Third, as part of RAPID, communities were asked to create a management committee. There 20 was no constraint placed on the composition of these committees other than size (at least 2 members and no more than 8). Insofar as women in leadership positions affects the role of women inside the community, we can reasonably expect women to be present and participate more in the discussions about RAPID and to take on leadership roles during the RAPID program. The results are given in Table 7 . We find that in areas without gender parity around 44% of those present during the Step A meeting are women. In parity communities, on average, 43% of those in attendance were women. The difference is very small and not statistically significant. We also find no evidence of impact when it comes to participation during these meetings. On average, 27% of all interventions were made by women, with marginally fewer interventions in parity communities. Moving to the RAPID committee composition, we find that there is a strong tendency towards male domination of committees: the average size of the RAPID committee is 7.6 members, of which only 1.7 members are women (or 22%). In fact, of 105 RAPID committees only 12 had gender parity in the RAPID committee and exactly half of these had been in the Tuungane gender parity treatment, and half in control. The rest of the RAPID committees had more men than women. 41 Table 7 shows that the share of women on the RAPID committee in parity and non-parity communities is largely the same. In summary, we find no evidence that having had women in leadership positions during the Tuungane program led to a change in the role of women in the community. 41 The breakdown is as follows: 0 women members = 16%, 1 = 30%, 2 = 28%, 3 = 18%, 4 = 8%.
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Attitudes Towards the Role of Women
Finally, we assess whether having had women in leadership positions has an impact on attitudes towards women. Even if there are no substantial effects on decision making, women's participation in decision making could still affect attitudes through demonstration effects. Table 8 reports the estimated effects of the parity treatment on the reported responses of five randomly sampled subjects to the attitudinal questions described in section 3.1. 42 We present the impact of gender parity on each statement individually, and for a combined measure at the end. 43 The table shows average values for those communities that did not have the parity requirement, and the effect of mandating gender parity. We find no evidence that attitudes are different in areas with gender parity compared to those areas where villagers were free to choose the gender composition of their VDC committee. Indeed in three of four measures, as well as the overall index, the effects point negative. Notes: Effect of parity requirement. We report sample average treatment effects. Regressions use block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village cluster level. Based on questionss QG8 -QG11. * p ≤ 0.10, * * p ≤ 0.05, * * * p ≤ 0.01.
42 Surveys were implemented in villages that had the RAPID intervention as well as villages in the same clusters that did not. 43 We add the latter because it may be that all individual measures trend positive, but none is individually statistically significant. In such a case it is possible that effects are jointly significant across the family of measures. Conversely, it may be that by chance a measure is significant in a family while most are not, or even trend in the wrong direction. In such a case it is possible that there are no significant effects across the family of measures. In order to generate a meaningful summary of multiple effects within each family we follow the approach of Kling et al. (2007) and create a standardized index that we indicate with 'Index' in Table 8 . The measure is created as follows. First, we redefine each of the variables of interest in a family, so that higher values for each variable imply positive effects. Second, we rescale each of the redefined variables using the (weighted) mean and standard deviation of the control group units. The index is then the standardized average of the redefined rescaled variables.
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Our study finds no evidence that the use of gender quotas by development actors in a large scale development intervention had an impact on project choice, the role of women in the community, or attitudes towards women. From one perspective the absence of effects may not be surprising. Existing gender relations can be resilient, and more fundamental change may require changes to fundamentals such as women's level of education. In the absence of changes to underlying power positions, the formal rules imposed by external groups may be of little consequence. This view resonates with a qualitative study of the Tuungane program, which found that illiteracy and a lack of education are some of the key barriers to active participation in community decision-making by women (IRC, 2014) .
Although this perspective may be correct, it ignores the fact that confidence in this kind of programmatic interventions finds support elsewhere, as we outlined in Section 2.
Thus, our question becomes: What might explain this null result, given evidence elsewhere of the effectiveness of quota based strategies?
Explanations could include features specific to the context in Eastern Congo and features specific to the intervention. We discuss these now.
Context
A first possibility to account for differences in outcomes between Congo and India is that the intervention in India took place in a context that was more receptive to efforts to change gender policies. The Indian intervention was internally generated in the sense that it emerged from Indian political processes (even if not at the GP level where it was implemented). This does not mean that the intervention was popular in India -and some accounts suggest that it was not (e.g. Polgreen (2010) ). But it signals that knowledgeable local actors believed that it could have an effect. This condition is perhaps less likely to hold if institutional innovation is introduced as a matter of policy by development actors independent of contextual characteristics.
Another reason could be that, in our context, men's and women's preferences differ too little. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) found differences in preferences -proxied by the types of formal requests brought to the GP -by men and women across other sectors.
In West Bengal, women complain more often than men about drinking water and roads.
In Rajasthan, women complain more often than men about drinking water but less often about roads. In Table 1 we show baseline preferences over public goods by gender. In contrast to the Indian case, we find few differences between men and women in preferences over projects in Eastern Congo. In this context the lack of effects of parity provisions on project choice is not surprising. Though this feature cannot account for the lack of effects on other behavioral measures of empowerment, where there are clear differences in the positions of men and women, and for gender attitudes more broadly.
Third, men's and women's attitudes to the gender relations may differ too little for demonstration effects to induce change. Table 2 shows how men and women in Eastern Congo have also largely similar opinions about four statements related to women's empowerment. In the study of Beaman et al. (2009) the differences on attitudes between men and women in India were also not strong; men and women evaluate the effectiveness of a hypothetical female leader largely similarly. They find that exposure to women leadership counters men's bias against women's effectiveness in leadership positions, although changes in broader attitudes and norms appear more difficult. Beaman et al. (2009) collected survey data from 6,642 male and 6,568 female respondents in 495 villages spread across the 165 GPs in Birbhum district. The survey also asked respondents to position themselves on ten statements related to women's empowerment. Table 22 in the appendix presents the responses using this data, by gender. We find that across nine of the ten statements, men and women do differ significantly; in some cases more men agreeing with a statement empowering women, while in other cases it is women that agree more with a statement supporting women's empowerment. 44 Thus although the data from Eastern Congo do not suggest a disconnect between the attitudes of men and women, the patterns from India do not suggest that this is a particularly salient feature. Theoretically it is also not clear that such differences are important. In a context in which there are clear gender imbalances in terms of positions of power in the village, learning could arise for both men and women even if there are no differences at the outset; moreover attitudinal differences could provide reasons for resistance to change.
The Intervention
There are at least five candidate explanations for the null result that are related to the intervention itself, all of which focus on ways that the intervention was or was not strong in some sense.
First, our study focused on changes in committee composition from male-dominated to parity structures. It is possible that parity is not enough to effect change. In India the reservation system ensured that women had monopoly control over a top position in selected areas and not simply greater representation. Other studies suggest important differences in behavior when groups are composed entirely of women rather than being mixed, as was the case in this study's parity areas (see for example Greig and Bohnet (2009) ). While it is possible that monopoly control may be required, there are still a number of logics through which 50% representation could produce a change in decisions.
Most obviously, the increase from a minority to parity changes the coalitional power of groups on different issues whether or not those coalitions are composed entirely of women.
In addition, the quantitative increase increases the scope for women to have their voices heard and produce demonstration effects. 45 These effects are plausibly enhanced by the fact that the intervention was designed to ensure that the positions of women were not trivial on these committees; Tuungane management committees in parity areas included women as co-presidents, co-secretary, co-treasurers and so on, and not simply as ordinary members. While we cannot rule out that effects would have been different with a more monopolistic allocation of power to women, we believe the treatment examined is for some purposes, more relevant. A parity allocation more closely reflects common donor practices, and is quite typical of the kind that is expected to generate strong effects. 46 A second possible explanation is that two years of exposure is simply too short to produce meaningful effects. Beaman et al. (2009) , for example, find that in India, the evaluation of female leaders was lower in those areas that had only a single period of mandated exposure before closing the gap in a second term. This suggests that effects may be slow to kick in. This logic may be in operation in Eastern Congo as well. More precisely, change may require sustained exposure to women in power of the form that is not typical of development projects. Development projects tend to be short in duration and the key decision making procedures in development projects are often front loaded. 47 A third possibility is that the intervention, while ex-ante promising, was subverted in practice by communities. In response to the gender parity requirement, village elites might have selected women that they expected to be weak in their leadership role. During
Step D (Table 4) , in addition to the household surveys, we also conducted interviews with two members of the Tuungane VDC committee. This data allows us to compare the characteristics of women on the VDC committees to those of randomly selected women 45 For discussion related to the importance of critical mass as well as decision rules matter for whether women's descriptive representation leads to substantive representation see e.g. Karpowitz et al. (2015) and Mendelberg et al. (2013) .
46 One piece of evidence that speaks in favor of this possibility comes from a survey implemented prior to launching our endline data collection. The survey asked project implementers (12 respondents) as well as a (convenience) sample of seven researchers working in Eastern Congo and Rwanda whether it was 'very unlikely', 'unlikely', 'likely' or 'very likely' that in parity zones, compared to non-parity zones, there would be a greater propensity of women to take on leadership roles. While 42% of implementers thought this unlikely, 50% thought this likely and 8% very likely. Among researchers 57% thought this unlikely, while 29% thought this likely and even 14% very likely. These beliefs reflect moderate ex ante confidence in the gender parity requirement.
47 Specifically, here the development actors expected any social effects to emerge early and longer term assessment of the Tuungane program also do not suggest broader long term social effects. See Laudati et al. (2017) for a five year follow up.
from the community. This question is not only important in and of itself, it also allows us to learn about our null result. If this type of selection is taking place we may expect that in non-parity communities a woman's level of education is an important determinant for VDC membership, while in parity communities it is not. Table 23 in the appendix presents the results from regressing a woman's VDC membership on a set of individual characteristics that we think are important for taking on a leadership position: a) wealth (as measured by whether the household's roof is made of metal), b) the woman's age (and a squared term), c) whether the woman is born in the village, and d) years of education. To test the claim whether in parity communities a woman's level of education is a less important determinant for VDC membership than in non-parity areas, we interact the latter with the gender parity status of the village. We find that education and age are important correlates of VDC membership, which resonates with results found in IRC (2014). These variables are statistically significant (p < 0.01), and remain robust to a large number of different model specifications. While Table 23 suggests that education is a less strong predictor of women's committee membership in parity areas, this difference is not statistically significant.
A fourth possibility is that the institutions targeted were not relevant: they may control too small budgets and/or are not the formal institutions enforced by the state. Although the budget allocated by the community as part of the Tuungane process -$3,000 -is small relative to amounts allocated elsewhere (for instance in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) , the gender quotas are introduced at the level of the Gram Panchayat, which is responsible for public buildings, irrigation, drinking water, roads, repairs, roads, and welfare programs including pensions), it is still large relative to funds provided by the state in this area. More consequential, in our opinion, are the differences in the form of the institutions.
The institutions targeted in India are a part of the formal state apparatus. Since the 1992 amendment to the constitution, the village council has primary responsibility in implementing development programs, as well as in identifying the needs of the villages under its jurisdiction. In Eastern Congo, traditional leaders are central to community level decision making and public goods provision (Section 3.2). Traditional leaders were not targeted in the project. Our implementing partner created the VDCs: a new, parallel institution, which does not exhibit the longevity of formal institutions. These novel institutional mechanisms may be weak and impose little constraint on actual decision making.
A final possible reason is that the power of the entire committee -and not just the power of women relative to men -was weak. Although in principle key decisions are made by the management committees, considerable efforts are taken by the development actors themselves to ensure that projects do not fail. This can include steering with respect to optimal project choice in an area (possibly reflecting engineering considerations or the support that could be provided by implementers) as well as measures to ensure limits Table 9 summarizes the above discussion. We find that both context and interventionspecific explanations may explain the null result. We return to this in the conclusion.
Conclusion
Optimism that institutional innovations can be used to strengthen the position of women has shaped development thinking and the design of development programs. We study the impact of one particularly popular innovation -gender parity provisions -that was implemented through a development program in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In each participating community, the development program formed a management committee to oversee the implementation of projects with an envelope of $3,000. A total of 661 communities entered a lottery: 337 communities were assigned to obligatory gender parity of the management committee, 324 communities were free to choose the committee's gender composition. By having women take on leadership roles it was expected that the program would lead to changes in the type of public goods provided and have further downstream effects on the role of women in communities and attitudes towards them. The random allocation of gender parity allows us to evaluate these claims causally.
Although other studies have found that innovations in formal institutions can alter the position of women, we find no evidence that efforts by development actors to produce the same results in the context of developing programming is successful. In the program we examined, the types of public goods produced were largely unaffected by the gender parity treatment and we find no evidence that women became more involved in community decision-making nor that gender parity improved attitudes about women.
We probe possible reasons for these null results. Although statistical power is a common concern when studies yield null results, many of the weak effects we see here are precisely estimated and a number of the larger effects trend in the wrong direction. We focus instead on more substantive explanations. We find no evidence that these results are due to bad implementation or, specifically, that the gender parity condition was undermined by communities selecting underqualified women to serve in mandated positions. We find some evidence that preferences do not diverge strongly by gender and this might account for the lack of effects on project choice, although this does not provide a compelling account for null results on downstream outcomes.
More compelling explanations, we believe, stem from the substantive differences in treatment that arise from the translation of parity principles in more formal institutions to parity provisions in development programming. That is, our study highlights a challenge for drawing inferences across cases on program effects. The evidence for the effects of gender parity provisions come from cases where considerable power is given to women for extended periods. When international development agencies seek to imitate these innovations they do so for problems in which their ability to re-allocate power is limited on multiple fronts.
They generally cannot replace or reform existing institutions. They often work over much shorter time periods. And, perhaps most ironically, development actors often operate with incentives that render project failure costly for them and so they seek to generate homogeneously successful outcomes no matter who the nominal decision makers are. These features may matter for a broader class of innovations than parity provisions and may signal the dangers of implementing small-scale design decisions based on learning from more structural institutional variation. 
A Timing of Intervention and Measurement
B Balance
The analyzes in this paper rely on randomization, which guarantees that the parity and non-parity areas are similar in expectation. In practice, however, it is possible for them to differ simply by virtue of unlucky draws. In response, we compare the different treatment conditions. Because we do not have baseline data for our study villages, we make use of the data collected in 2012. We limit ourselves to pre-treatment information and variables that do not change due to the treatment. We analyze the following variables. Distance from a set of (nearest) points of importance: well, market, public transport, primary school, secondary school, health facility, pharmacy, clinic, mine, post office, and the chiefdom headquarters. Across all measures we do not obtain the target number of observations because some respondents replied: "Don't know," "Not Applicable" or "Refuses to respond". Table 10 lists the mean and standard deviation for each variable for the parity and the non-parity areas. We also test the difference between both, where we cluster the errors at the village cluster level and use block fixed effects. The results suggest that there are no strong differences across the parity and the nonparity groups, which is consistent with what is to be expected given the random assignment. 
C Attrition and Missing Responses
In this section, we discuss attrition and missing responses in more detail. We also show that both are unrelated to the gender parity treatment status. Table 11 gives, for each result table in the main text, an overview of the number of targeted observations, the number of observations actually used for analysis, and possible imbalances between treatment conditions and a brief observation.
First, we make use of data provided by our implementing partner to examine the selection of projects in Tuungane (Table 5 ). The data contains information on all 661 villages (from 149 village clusters). In our analysis, we make use of 654 villages because project documents miss information about project choice for seven villages. The imbalance across treatment conditions is due to four villages with missing information, all of which are in the same (nonparity) cluster; thus only one cluster is affected by this data loss.
Second, to examine downstream effects on RAPID project selection and behavior (Tables 6 and 7), we build on data collected during steps A and B of the RAPID project. We targeted to implement RAPID in one (randomly selected) community of the 149 village clusters. In total, Step A of RAPID was implemented in 110 villages, and Step B in 105 villages. For Step A, we collected data in 49/54 villages in Haut Katanga, 12/51 villages in Maniema, and 44/44 villages in South Kivu. We lost 39 villages in Maniema because of political tensions in the run up to the 2011 elections, which led to the expulsion of our teams from the entire province. This is by far the most important source of data loss, yet it takes place at a level above the level of the lottery blocks. We also lost data on 5 villages in Haut Katanga (for which we do have Step B and D data). Those analyses involving
Step A data thus make use of information from 105 villages. Note that for Table   7 's indicator related to the share of women present during Step A's general assembly, we lose one observation because one village recorded 4014 men present, which we believe is a transcription error. We dropped this outlier. For Step B, we collected data in 54/54 villages in Haut Katanga, 10/51 villages in Maniema, and 41/44 villages in South Kivu.
For three villages in South Kivu we do not have Step B data (we do have Step A and D data for these villages). Those analyses involving Step B data thus also make use of information from 105 villages. Again, we find no evidence that the missing data is related to the parity treatment status.
Our third outcome of interest are downstream effects on attitudes (Table 8) , which builds on data collected during RAPID's Step D. In fact, in parallel to Step D, we aimed to visit a second (randomly selected) community in each of the 149 community clusters. In these communities, which did not receive RAPID, we only conducted the household survey among five randomly selected households (half men, half women). We thus targeted 1,490 respondents from 298 villages. In total, we collected data in 200 instead of the 298 targeted villages (103 RAPID villages and 97 survey-only villages). In Haut Katanga, we were able to visit 102 of the 108 targeted villages. Six villages we were unable to reach for security reasons. In Maniema, we collected Step D data in only 10 of the targeted 102 villages.
Again, this major source of data loss took place at a level above the lottery bins and thus affected villages equally in all treatment conditions. In South Kivu, data was collected in all 88 targeted villages. Table 8 , however, does not make use of 1,000 respondents from these 200 villages. The first reason for data missingness is failures in the field, ranging from loss, damage, or theft of tablets, water damage to paper surveys, or enumerator error in the implementation of surveys or particular questions. Given the challenging environment to collect data in the Congo, this category is relatively small and affects a total of 6.5% of surveys (65 respondents). The remaining data missingness comes from respondents that answer either "I don't know," "I refuse to respond" or "Not Applicable". We report the numbers in Table 11 . There is again no evidence that the missing data is related to the parity treatment status.
In sum, the data suggest that the probability of attrition is similar across treatment conditions. Although unlikely, we acknowledge that those villages lost in treatment and control conditions may be different. 
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F Gender Parity Based on Project Data
The main text reports results based on gender parity as recorded by the research team in
2006. The distribution of women on the VDC committee is presented in the top row in Figure 3 , where we separate nonparity and parity areas. Tables 14 to 17 reproduces the four main result tables, where we base our analyses on project data. Notes: Effect of parity requirement. We report sample average treatment effects. Regressions use block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village cluster level. Based on questionss QG8 -QG11. * p ≤ 0.10, * * p ≤ 0.05, * * * p ≤ 0.01.
G Local Average Treatment Effects
In this section we present local average treatment effects, where the research data serves as instrument and the treatment is program data. Notes: Effect of parity requirement. We report sample average treatment effects. Regressions use block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village cluster level. Based on questionss QG8 -QG11. * p ≤ 0.10, * * p ≤ 0.05, * * * p ≤ 0.01. Beaman et al. (2009) collected survey data from 6,642 male and 6,568 female respondents in 495 villages spread across the 165 GPs in Birbhum district. 48 The data include information about attitudes towards women's empowerment. Specifically, the survey asked respondents to position themselves on the following ten statements:
H Attitudes Towards Women Empowerment in India
1. A man is never justified in hitting his wife 2. Parents should maintain stricter control over their daughters than their sons 3. For the most part, it is better to be a man than to be a woman 4. It would be a good idea to elect a woman as the President of India 5. A wife shouldn't contradict her husband in public 6. Preschool children suffer if their mother works 7. In a disaster, women ought to be rescued before men 8. Women should be cherished and protected by men 9. Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility 10. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives
We explore differences in responses by gender. To present the results in a similar manner as Tables 2 and 8 , we create a score that equals 1 (2) for those (strongly) agreeing with the statement, and -1 (-2) for those (strongly) disagreeing. Respondents may also register as indifferent (0). We follow Beaman et al. (2009) and use block fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the GP level. Table 22 presents the results. Notes: Attitudes towards women's empowerment in Birbhum district. Data from Beaman et al. (2009) . Regressions use block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at GP level. * p ≤ 0.10, * * p ≤ 0.05, * * * p ≤ 0.01.
I Determinants of VDC Committee Membership
During
Step D, we also conducted interviews with two members of the Tuungane VDC committee. We compare their characteristics with those of five randomly selected individuals from the community. We do this analysis based on data from women only, and only in areas that participated in the CDD program and the gender parity lottery. As noted in the main text, we collected Step D data in only 200 of the 298 targeted villages (103 RAPID villages and 97 survey-only villages). Because VDC members were difficult to trace, we were able to collect data on 247 VDC members, of which 105 were women. We obtain data from 909 community members, of which 446 are women. In Table 23 we make use of 510 instead of 551 observations because of item non-response, particularly related to age. The magnitudes presented are marginal effects from a probit regression, evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. Notes: Determinants of membership to Tuungane VDC committee. N=510. Based on questions: QF8, QF13, QE2, QF9, SP1. Probit regression where the dependent variable is a woman's CDV membership, evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. We report sample average treatment effects. Standard errors clustered at village level. * p ≤ 0.10, * * p ≤ 0.05, * * * p ≤ 0.01.
